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UNrIL THE twentieth century, venereal diseases presented almost unmanageable
problems to Western man. In times of war they took an especially heavy toll, pro-
ducing as late as the nineteenth century a rate ofinfection sometimes double that of
peacetime. Given the vast movement and dislocation of people and the relaxation
inmorals associated withwar, military leaders had no choice but to resign themselves
to the inevitability of rampant infection.1
The First World War, however, promised to be different. By 1914, thanks to
August Wasserman's development of a test for syphilis and Paul Ehrlich's discovery
of arsphenamine, military and civilian medicine finally had available the means for
both identifying and curing syphilis, at least in its early stage. Consequently, as that
conflict began, there was optimism that one of the major venereal diseases was at
last going to be mastered.
Disease prevention, however, involved more than merely knowing how to kill a
certain virulent bacterium. In any public health problem, non-medical factors such
as organization, education, and methods of enforcement also assumed vital roles.
In the case ofvenereal disease, one had to deal as well with a whole set ofcultural
and psychological factors. For most of the combatants in World War I, those non-
medical problems thwarted the realization ofhopes for disease control. The British,
in particular, were not able to organize effectively against venereal diseases until the
last stages ofthe war. That they began to do so then was largely attributable to aid
and advice from the Americans, who alone among the warring powers succeeded in
making effective application of the new medical knowledge. The reasons for the
American success, notallpraiseworthy, werenonetheless instructive, fortheyrevealed
much about the relative strength ofpublic health forces in Britain andAmerica. They
also reflected considerable variation in the value systems ofthe two countries, which
explained better than anything the uneven results attained against wartime venereal
diseases.
*E. H. Beardsley, Ph.D., Associate Professor of History, University of South Carolina, Columbia,
South Carolina 29208, U.S.A.
1 For a discussion oftheimpact ofsyphilis onfifteenth-century Europe, seeAlfred W. Crosby,Jr.,
T7e Columbian exchange. Biologicalandculturalconsequences of1492, Westport, Conn., Greenwood
PublishingCompany, 1972, pp. 122-164. Forthenineteenth century see Modern treatment ofsyphilis,
Springfield, Illinois, C. C Thomas, 1947, p. 603.
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I
When warbeganin 1914, the British wereill-prepared to copewithvenereal disease.
Army leaders, who had not fought a major war in over a century, regarded prostitu-
tion as something between a necessary evil and a vital auxiliary service. Venereal
disease was regrettable, ofcourse, but given the demands ofhuman nature it was not
to be avoided. The best that a commanding officer could do was ensure that only
healthy women worked his ranks.
Officially, the army frowned on segregated districts, but unofficially they formed
part of the organization of every overseas unit. As one officer reported in 1917,
"when I first served . . . [in India], we had a bazaar ofnative women which we kept
and where the women were kept clean.... I can assure you that ... I lectured my
men on the prevention ofdisease and how to have connection with a woman without
acquiring the disease."2 Owing to tradition, then, when Britain's high command sent
soldiers to the continent in 1914, it allowed them to patronize the regulated brothels,
or maisons tolkrJes, which the French maintained for their troops.
In France, neither army tried to curb the sexual activity of its men or to prevent
lawful prostitution. To do so would have defied the conventional wisdom, which held
that anarmy's morale was dependent onfrequent sexual contact and itshealth, on the
medically certified brothel. British units did have treatment rooms where soldiers
could get medication (normally calomel ointment) to prevent infection. Furthermore,
regulations required a visit to such facilities within twenty-four hours of exposure,
but the absence of a penalty for refusing to comply defeated the army's purpose.3
In 1917, whenitbegan to be apparent thatthe maison tolrdee was no longer an accept-
able solution, either medically orpolitically, the British Army found itselftoo steeped
in tradition to adjust to new strategies.
On the civilian front, problems were worse. Not until a Royal Commission study
appeared in 1916 was it possible to generate viable public discussion of venereal
diseases. Physicians and others who had attempted to deal with the problem in the
public press or in book form found few editors willing to notice their views.4 Dis-
tasteful matters such assyphilis andgonorrhoea simply were notfittopicsforcivilians.
One English doctor, asked to lecture on venereal diseases to a group of soldiers, had
just begun his talkwhenhe saw thecommanderhand anote to the battalion chaplain.
The clergyman got up, left the hall, and only returned at the lecture's end. Curious,
the doctor askedwhyhe hadleft. Thechaplain repliedthathis colonel had asked him
to go "because he did not consider the lecture a proper one" for clerical ears.6
Public silence ended with the Commission report. Its findings, especially the claim
that ten per cent of the population had syphilis and a much higher proportion,
gonorrhoea, received wide publicity in the press and Parliament. Outlining a plan
2Proceedings of the Imperial War Conference, 12th day, 24 April 1917, WO 32/11404, p. 197,
Public Record Office, London (Hereafter, PRO).
s Sir Bryan Donkin, 'The fight against venereal infection', Nineteenth Century, January, 1918,
83: 188-89; also see Minutes of Conference on "The Temptations of Overseas Troops", (10 May
1918), p. 37, W032/11404, PRO. (Hereafter, Conference).
4 Sir Bryan Donkin, 'The fight against venereal infection', Nineteenth Century, September, 1917,
82: 585, 588.
6The Times (London), 6 June 1918, p. 3c.
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of action, the Commission called for public education, curbs on drunkenness and
illicit sex, and better facilities for diagnosis and treatment.6 The recommendations
received attention immediately. Aprivate group, the National Council for Combating
Venereal Disease (NCCVD), had come into being, in fact, expressly to implement the
study. By 1916, the government was placing large funds at its disposal to help meet
what one spokesman termed "this terrible peril to our imperial race."7
Yet for all its support, the NCCVD did little to reduce venereal disease. Council
critics, mainly physicians, attributed its ineffectiveness to an unwillingness to promote
medical prophylaxis, the one approach that might eliminate the disease.8 According
to Sir Bryan Donkin, a prominent London doctor, the Council's reluctance was due
to a beliefthat venereal diseases must be fought and overcome on moral rather than
medical grounds. Encouragement of preventives would only stimulate Englishmen
to sin with impunity, lessening the chance for victory on the moral front. To Donkin,
the moral approach had no place in public health. The proper strategy was to use
whatever would work, even if that meant distributing ointment and condoms to
servicemen before they had sexual contact.9
Although Donkin exaggerated Council opposition to medical approaches, its
leaders did tend to be moral crusaders, who frankly preferred to see sickness continue
ifits elimination meant an increased sexual laxity. As the Archbishop of Canterbury
said, "the real foe was not the disease but the vice which was the parent of the
disease."10
A mainstay of the NCCVD was Sir Francis Champneys, a leader of the "Old
Guard" in London medicine. Champneys, while not unconcerned about public
health and military effectiveness, viewed the struggle against venereal diseases chiefly
as a form of Christian witness. In a reply to Donkin, Champneys argued that the
real issue was not prophylaxis-the NCCVD was for early treatment-but whether
prophylaxis would take a form which would lead to sin. That was exactly what
Donkin's plan for issuing prophylactic packets would do, for "a man with a packet
is more likely to commit himself than a, man who is without one."11
Even iftheir use drastically reduced venereal disease, the moral cost was too high,
for "fornication and adultery in the Christian system," Champneys insisted, "are
mortal sins . . . which ... destroy the soul." Far better that "venereal diseases should
be imperfectly combated than that, in an attempt to prevent them, men should be
enticed into mortal sin . . .".12
By 1917 it was apparent that the NCCVD's approach was not working, at least
6 Donkin, op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 580, 582, 585; also Thomas Barlow, 'Report of the Royal
Commission on Venereal Diseases', Contemporary Review, April, 1916, 109: 450.
?Ibid., pp. 450-451.
Donkin, op. cit., note 4above, pp. 583, 584; onDonkin, see Who Was Who, 1916-1928, London,
A. G. C. Black, 1947, pp. 294-295. The standard preventive treatment was careful washing with
soap and water, followed by application ofcalomel ointment.
' Donkin, op. cit., note 4 above, pp. 585, 598, 592.
10 The Times (London), 6 July 1918, p. 3e.
11 Frances Champneys, 'The fight against venereal infection. A reply to Sir Bryan Donkin',
Nineteenth Century, November 1917, 82: 1049. On Champneys see Dictionary ofNational Biography,
1922-1930 (Oxford University Press, 1937), pp. 169-170 (hereafter, DNB).
13 Champneys, op. cit., note 11 above, pp. 1052-1054.
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not for British and Dominon troops in England and Scotland. While the Council
congratulated itself on the expansion of local branches throughout the Empire,
prostitution was also growing-at a runaway pace-in major British cities.
The English approach to prostitution differed fromthe French. Theformerbelieved
that regulation and inspection of prostitutes were more apt to increase venereal
disease than curtail it, because official collaboration with organized vice gave male
customers an unwarranted sense of safety. So, local police foreswore all attempts at
regulation, intervening only when a woman became so unruly as to create a public
nuisance.'3
In the absence of legal controls, professional and amateur prostitutes enjoyed
almost full freedom to solicit, and it was mainly Dominion troops they pursued,
because Canadians, New Zealanders, and Australians had more money. Apparently,
the women were as bold as they were numerous, especially in places like railroad
stations and parks. As one medical officer recalled, "in the early days when leave was
given to large numbers of men the scenes were disgraceful. One saw 1000s of men
coming from Flanders covered with mud, and... although their clothing was muddy
they could hardly get through the streets from Victoria Station on account of the
women crowding about them and even waiting for them until they had cleaned up
and got paid off."'4
Such liaisons need not have resulted in high rates ofdisease had there been ample
treatment centres available to soldiers on leave. Australia's surgeon-general was dis-
mayedbythelackofsuchfacilities,theresultofwhichwastheinfectionandincapacita-
tion of some 2000-3000 of his men. The Australians eventually demanded clinics for
the bigger British cities. To that request, the surgeon-general "received a reply that
the matter had been referred to the Colonial Office and that is, I think, about the
reply one expects. In other words ... it will probably be replied to when the war is
over." 1
At the April 1917 meeting of the Imperial War Conference, the issue of venereal
disease erupted as a serious problem for the British government. The anger of
Canadian Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden reflected the intensity of feeling in the
Dominions: "I say unhesitatingly that if I should be Prime Minister of Canada on
the outbreak of another war, I would not send one man overseas if the conditions
were such as have prevailed during the progress of this war.... I am absolutely
astonished that no steps of any reasonable or adequate character have been taken
here topreventthese women swarming round ourcamps all over this kingdom....'' 1
One handicap Britain faced in dealing with solicitation was a shortage of local
police, which military drafts had reduced to "bedrock". What police remained were
powerless to act. New Zealanders operated a canteen in Russell Square and according
to High Commissioner Sir Thomas MacKenzie, "the women flock there in the
18Abraham Flexner, An autobiography, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1960, pp. 118-119; see
also Flexner, Prostitution in Europe, New York, 1914, chapter ix.
4 Conference (10 May 1918), p. 14W032/11404, PRO.
Ibid., pp. 28-29. 16Quoted in Proceedings of the Imperial War Conference, 13th Day (19 July 1918), p. 4, WO
32/11404, PRO. On Borden see The Cambridge history ofthe British Empire, Cambridge University
Press, 1930, vol. 6, p. 736.
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hundreds. The men cannot get out of or return to the canteen without molestation.
I went to the Chief of the Police here and represented the matter to him; he said,
'I know that condition prevails, but I have no authority whatsoever to act' and he
does not act."17
All at the War Conference agreed that tighter controls over solicitation was one
way to protect soldiers' and sailors' health. The next year London finally moved
against the problem, but in the meantime, the situation inthe leading cities continued
toworsenuntilbytheendof1917venereal diseasehadbecome amajorwarproblem.18
Although they were barely in the war by that time, Americans, too, regarded
venereal disease with serious apprehension. Concern was great because the problem
wasgreat,especially inthe autumn of1917,whenthefirstmajordraft occurred. Health
officials and military leaders had anticipated an increase in venereal disease once
mobilization began, but no one foresaw what actually occurred. By the end of the
second week ofmobilization, the disease rate for the newconscript army had vaulted
to 357 cases per 1000 men, about four times the Regular Army rate, while in the
National Guard it had climbed to 150.19 In the period from September 1917 until the
following May, some 80,000 cases were discovered among new soldiers, most of
whom brought their infection into the army from civilian lifee.
As if such reports were not alarming enough, scenes around many military en-
campments that autumnsuggested thatmanymore servicemenwould soon be infected.
South Carolina was one state that quickly took on the appearance ofan armed camp
and an army ofcamp followers soon gathered to do their service. The fact that most
were diseased led one War Department official to lament that "if the Kaiser could
get these women right close to our troops and nobody would keep them away . ..
he would win this war."21
If such women saw the war as their opportunity, they failed to reckon with the
determination ofmost other Americans to stop them. Infact, the country had seldom
seen the kind ofteamwork between public and private sectors and between national,
state, and local governments thatevolved in 1917 to combatprostitution andvenereal
disease.
In part, the wartime campaign against vice was a continuation ofanearliercrusade
dating from the Progressive Era. To some extent, even the leadership from the two
periods overlapped, as in the cases of Newton Baker, Midwestern reform mayor and
later Secretary ofWar, and Raymond Fosdick, prominent Eastern social worker and
foundation agent, who teamed up in 1917 to create the Commission on Training
Camp Activities.22
But the wartime anti-vice campaign was more than just a Progressive crusade in
khaki, for groups and individuals became involved who had no ties with the earlier
17 Conference (I1 July 1918) p. 20, WO 32/11404, PRO. On MacKenzie see An encyclopedia of
New Zealand, Wellington, N.Z., 1966, vol. 2, p. 366.
18 Proceedings ofImperial War Conference, 13th Day (19 July 1918), pp. 7-8 W032/11404, PRO.
19 William A. Pusey, 'Venereal problem in the U.S. Army', J. Amer. med. Ass., 1918, 71: 1022.
'O Senate Military Affairs Committee, Hearings, (18 June 1918), p. 65, Sixty-fifth Congress, 2nd
Session.
21 Ibid., p. 90.
22Allen F. Davis, 'Welfare, Reform, and World WarI', American Quarterly, 1967, 19: 528.
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reform thrust, nor any long-range reform goals. They were merely seeking an outlet
for a heightened nationalism, but not having any real live Germans and Austrians to
confront, they focused on prostitutes and venereal disease as suitable substitutes.
Initial steps were taken by the War Department. Before American entry, Secretary
Baker began receiving alarming stories ofthe war's effect on venereal disease rates in
European armies. One claimed that as many as twenty-five per cent of some units
were incapacitated by syphilis and gonorrhoea.23 These reports, plus the knowledge
that America's army tolerated and at times encouraged contact between soldiers
and prostitutes, led Baker to veto the establishment of military quarters in any city
harbouring a red light district. Town boosters, who had traditionally bid for the
army's presence with promises of women, drink, and gambling, were flabbergasted.
Butunderpressure fromWashington, army towns and thoseplaces hoping to become
army towns speedily closed their segregated districts.24
Making legal brothels illegal was only one of the Department's steps. To help
(and strongly encourage) cantonment towns to rid themselves of illegal prostitution
and bootleggers, Baker approved the creation ofthe Commission on Training Camp
Activities and put Raymond Fosdick at its head. Fosdick had first urged Baker to
take a strong stand against legalized prostitution, but in his new post he was con-
cerned with more than just suppression of vice and drink. Equally important was
providing alternative recreation. Seeking to divert soldiers' attention fromthe seamier
side of life, programmes fell for the most part into the "good, clean fun" category
and included such activities as sports events, theatrical entertainments, and a host of
educational programmes.25
Private organizations became involved as well. The American Medical Association,
through its meetings and Journal, campaigned vigorously for action against venereal
disease. Just after U.S. entry into the war, the Journal warned ofthe dangers ahead
and urged military and public health authorities to take measures to protect the
hundreds ofthousands ofyoung men "being called toconcentration camps".'6 When
it became apparent that the anticipated dangers had materialized, the Journal began
to function as a clearing house for information on venereal disease.'7
The most intense activity occurred at the state and local levels. The appalling inci-
dence ofdisease among draftees proved convincingly that, contrary to popular belief,
the army was not the major source of the nation's venereal disease. Obviously, if
Americans were to protect their soldiers, they must begin by eliminating the problem
in the civilian population.
California acted first. That autumn (1917) its legislature took $60,000 from war
23Thomas Parran, andR. A. Vonderlehr, Plain words about VD, NewYork, Reynal &Hitchcock,
1941, pp. 81-84.
24Tbid; Flexner, Autobiography, op. cit., note 13 above, p. 123; Fred D. Baldwin, 'The invisible
armor', American Quarterly, 1964, 16: 434-435.
25 William Snow and Wilbur Sawyer, 'VD control in the Army', J. Amer. med. Ass., 1918, 71:
459; 'Program ofsocial hygiene for soldiers', ibid., 1917, 69: 654; William A. Pusey, 'Handling of
the venereal problem', ibid., 1918, 71: 1017.
2 'NYEvening Post starts campaign against venereal diseases', ibid., 1917, 69: 387.
27 'Venereal peril to Army', ibid., 1917, 69: 734; 'Editorial', ibid., p. 916; 'The venereal diseases:
complications ofgonorrhea', ibid., pp. 1257-1261: 'Control ofVD in theArmy. General discussion',
ibid., p. 1538.
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emergency funds to create a Bureau of Venereal Disease within the state board of
health. Armed also with new police powers, California's board began quarantining
all persons reasonably suspected of having venereal disease. If tests confirmed sus-
picions, confinement continued until an attending physician judged the patient
non-infective.28
It was at the local level where co-operation between government, health and
military sectors was most apparent. In Spartanburg, S.C., police used uniformed
soldiers to raidlocal brothels. A U.S. Public HealthServicephysicianproved tobethe
catalyst in organizing Chicago and other Illinois cities against venereal disease.29 In
Seattle, a combination oflocal citizens andthemilitarygot thecitygovernment to set
up a mandatory treatment andrehabilitation programme forthat town's prostitutes' 0
Not all places were responsive to such pressures. Shreveport, Louisiana, where
men of the 39th Division took leave, promised to eliminate its segregated district,
but action was hardly vigorous. "At least one notorious house", an Army official
reported, "keptrunningin highgear". Thecityalso did little to stop theflowofliquor
to soldiers, and thepractice with arrested prostitutes was simply to release them, once
they promised to leave town.81
In most places, though, the anti-vice crusade was successful. By the end ofthe war,
the red light district had virtually disappeared from the American urban scene, and
as far as service drinking wasconcerned, it was negligible. One army doctor observed,
with only slight exaggeration, that "the U.S. Army at the present time is a body of
total abstainers."32 Largely because of the closing of so many brothels and saloons
the army's venereal disease rate fell sharply after the autumn of1917. Merritt Ireland,
chief medical officer of the American Expeditionary Force, told of progress with
National Army recruits and boasted: "we have taken these young men, and . . . we
have cleaned them up until the disease is as low if not lower than the rate in the
regular army," whose rate by then had dropped to 55 cases per 1000 men.ss
More than just patriotism and teamwork, however, produced those sharply de-
clining disease rates. The tacticsAmericans usedwere also a factor, andin 1917-1918
they included such practices as official and unofficial intimidation, denial of civil
rights, and occasional resort to that old American stand-by, vigilante action.
While Washington was less apt to overstep constitutional limits than local govern-
ments and private groups, agents in the field were not always so cautious. Training
Camp Commission lawyer Alan Johnstone, who had the job of enforcing policy in
28 'Editorial', ibid.,p. 916; H. G. Irvine, 'Syphilis andvenereal diseases as apublichealthproblem',
ibid., 1918, 71: 1029.
29 Discussion ofSnow, Sawyer paper on VD, op. cit., note 25 above, ibid., p. 462. The U.S.P.H.S.
worked closely with the states in controlling venereal disease during the war. With the passage of
the Chamberlain-Kahn Act (July 1918), this relationship was intensified. This law, which set up a
Division of VD in the U.S.P.H.S. and put an agent in every state, gave state boards of health
$1,000,000 a year, on a matching basis, to use in controlling venereal disease. See R. H. Shryock,
American medical research past andpresent, New York, Commonwealth Fund, 1947, p. 271; also
J. Amer. med. Ass., 1918, 71: 2101.
I' W. Ray Jones, 'A successful venereal prevention campaign', ibid., pp. 1291-1292.
31 Lloyd Thompson and J. R. Bolasny, 'VD in the 39th Division', ibid., p. 1297.
32 William A. Pusey, 'Handling venereal problem in army', ibid., p. 1017; also Davis, 'Welfare,
reform, and World War I', American Quarterly, 1967, 19: 530.
33 Conference (10 May 1918), p. 22, W032/11404, PRO.
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South Carolina, argued that the only way to deal with promiscuous females who
refused to seek treatment was to intern them for the duration of the war. The two
reformatoriesforwomenthenunderconstruction in the Carolinas, Johnstone claimed,
were forjust that purpose.Y
At the state level, policy itselfwas sometimes oppressive. Illinois Board of Health
official St. Clair Drake conceded that his state perhaps went too far in controlling
venereal disease. One of the Board's powers was the authority to hospitalize any
womanthoughtto be infected. Ifshe refused, the boardposted a large placard on her
home reading "suspected VD". While such practice was surely effective, it also
opened the way for blackmail of innocent women.35 A Pennsylvania public health
officer reflected the get-tough approach of many of his colleagues in the states when
he said: "we mean to have our health officials treat the man with gonorrhoea and
syphilis ... who cannot be kept under medical control with as little respect to his
rights as they would treat one suffering from smallpox."36
Some individuals did not seek any evidence before moving against a suspect. For
swift action reminiscent ofthe Old West, the ladies ofRockfort, Illinois, set the pace.
Determined to guard the health and purity of civilians and soldiers in their area, a
delegation of women met each train that came to town. If a questionable looking
female alighted on to theplatform, theytook her aside and told herbluntly to "return
where she came from". Ifshe refused, the decency brigade thereafter kept her under
close watch. "Sooner or later," said an appreciative physician, "she is put in jail or
gotten out of town." Such activity, he noted, "has a splendid effect on the canton-
ment in the prevention ofvenereal disease."37
Although purity committees, health officers, and government lawyers doubtless
helped reduce venereal disease, the most significant deterrent was the army's use of
direct medical prophylaxis. In 1912, while the British Army was relying on regulated
prostitution, American Army doctors were pressing for a system of early medical
treatment. Previously, the army had issued prophylactic kits to its men, but most
soldiers had refused to use them. What was needed, doctors successfully argued, was
for the army to administer preventive treatment, itself, and require men to take it.
To enforce that policy, the War Department ordered that any soldier who failed to
gettreatment, andlaterdevelopedvenerealdisease, wouldfacetrial and imprisonment
for neglect of duty. If he contracted it despite treatment, he lost all pay during his
hospitalization. Early treatment was strongly emphasized, and by the time of the
war, army doctors were telling men to wait no longer than three hours after exposure.
The new procedures, along with frequent lectures and medical inspections, proved
quickly effective. Within ayearvenereal disease in the Regular Army fell by forty-five
per cent.38 Some physicians, however, urged the army to go further, to resume the
issue of prophylactic packets and require their use, by severely punishing anyone
34 Hearings before Senate Military Affairs Committee, (18 June 1918), p. 89, 65th Cong., 2nd Sess.
86 'Discussion ofSnow, Sawyer Paper on VD', op. cit., note 29 above, p. 462.
3s 'Control ofVD in the Army. Discussion,' op. cit., note 27 above, p. 1537; also see Jones, op.
cit., note 30 above, p. 1297.
87 'Discussion ofvenereal diseases', J. Amer. med. Ass., 1918, 71: 1034.
*8 Conference (10 May 1918), 22-24, WO 32/11404, PRO; also Pusey, op. cit., note 19 above,
p. 1022; 'Discussion on VD', J. Amer. med. Ass., 1918, 71: 1294-1295.
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failing to do so. "It would seem," one doctor argued, "that if we cannot bring the
man to the treatment within 60 minutes, the treatment ought to go with him."39
By wartime, however, such practice was no longer acceptable to many military
leaders, particularly those who owed their positions to politics. Secretary of the
Navy, Josephus Daniels was emphatic about his opposition to the distribution of
prophylactic materials. "American mothers," he said, had entrusted their sons to
his keeping with the expectation that "every good and Christian influence" would
be "fostered and strengthened" by Navy service. "I could not look a boy ... straight
in the face .. . if I were approving the policy and use of a measure of this kind."40
Another leader who felt a similar responsibility was General John J. Pershing,
Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Force. His determination to
bring his men home with only honourable wounds faced a serious test in 1917 in the
French system ofregulated prostitution. Eager to welcome their new ally, the French
invited the newly arriving Americans to make use oftheir brothels. The results were
disastrous. Disease rates at French base ports climbed quickly above 190 and one
journalist recalled seeing American soldiers lined up eight deep at the doorways of
one port city brothel.41
When Pershing learned what was happening he reacted swiftly, putting all brothels
in the vicinity of embarkation ports and training areas out of bounds to American
soldiers. Moreover, any man who contracted venereal disease became liable for court
martial and any commander failing to hold his unit's disease rate to a minimum
risked losing his command.'2
The French response to Pershing's actions ranged from mild amusement at
American nalvete to angry complaints from politicians and brothel owners. When
Prime Minister Georges Clemengeau protested in heat that Americans were ignorant
of modem health methods, Pershing invited French medical officials to confer with
his doctors. Ultimately, American Expeditionary Force epidemiologists were able to
demonstrate that there was no such thing as regulating a brothel, that some women
who never reacted positively to tests nonetheless spread disease to every man they
slept with. In the end, French doctors admitted that "they were wrong . .. and the
American forces were probably right," and promised to recommend initiation of
U.S. medical practice in their army.'3
No such doubts assailed the British Army, whose leaders continued to let their
soldiers use the medically approved brothels." Rumours circulated that the British
I' Ibid.
'4 Quoted in Frances Champneys, 'The fight against venereal infection', Nineteenth Century, 1918,
83: 617-618. Daniels' statements were a part of a 1915 order to all Commanding Officers.
"" Lawrence Stallings, The Doughboys. 7hestory oftheAEF, 1917-18, New York, Harper& Row,
1963, p. 179; Raymond Fosdick, 'The fight against VD', The New Republic, 1918, 17: 132-133; also
seeJohn J. Pershing, Myexperiences in the World War, vol. 2, New York, Frederick A. Stokes, 1931,
p. 44.
" Fosdick, op. cit., note 41 above, p. 133.
" Conference (10 May 1918), p. 23, and Conference (11 July 1918), p. 11, WO 32/11404, PRO;
Parran and Vonderlehr, op. cit., note 23 above, pp. 73-74; Fosdick, op. cit., note 41 above, pp.
133-134.
" As late as March 1918 the Adjutant General ofthe British forces claimed that the venereal rate
wouldgoup iftheFrenchmaisonswereputoutofbounds. SeeWarCabinetConclusions, WC 366(13).
18 March 1918, CAB 23/5, PRO.
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were even operating houses ofpleasure, themselves, in such French ports as Cayeux-
Sur-Mer and Le Havre. Supposedly, commanders urged their men to patronize
those places because their girls were sure to be clean." Whether true or not, the
stories gained wide circulation in Britain, and in the early months of 1918 were a
source ofincreasing concern to the government. Church leaders began calling for an
investigation ofarmy ties to organized prostitution, and by March, the large London
dailies were referring to the "Cayeux scandals" and also demanding action."8
Domestic prostitution presented an even graver problem. In 1917 Dominion
leaders had insisted that London take steps to protect their soldiers from disease,
but the passage of a year saw only a worsening situation. A New Zealand doctor
was shocked by the boldness of some English women. In Liverpool, men were not
safe even on the second floors oftheir barracks because prostitutes got at them with
the use of scaling ladders.47
Such conditions stirred an angry response from the Dominions, both from agents
in London and from people back home. Canada's mothers were especially upset.
According to her Privy Council President, they were willing "for their sons to go
and die" for the empire, but they would not tolerate their being exposed to sin and
disease in British streets.48
By March 1918, the British government was in serious difficulty, for it stood to
lose a large amount ofcitizen support in Britain and the Dominions over prostitution
and venereal disease. Regarding the French brothels, the Secretary of State for War,
the Earl of Derby, told his War Cabinet colleagues that a "very large number of the
people of the country resent with passionate indignation what they regard as our
approval of ... institutions which are alien to the traditions ofthis country." Unless
the government took steps, "the outbursts of indignation will continue to increase
and might have a far reaching effect upon the good will of a most respectable part
of the community towards the Government and the National cause."'9
In an effort to quiet critics, the War Cabinet took two actions. On 18 March it
placed the maisons tolerees out ofbounds for Crown troops. Fourdays later, it issued
regulation No. 40d(ofthe Defence ofthe RealmAct), makingit acriminal offence for
anywomanwith avenerealdisease to solicit orhave sexual relations with anymember
of His Majesty's forces. In both steps, the Cabinet saw some risk-that of alienating
the French in one case and the House of Commons in the other-but the need for
action was too insistent to resist, and hopefully the measures would reduce disease.50
It was soon apparent that London had been too optimistic. If anything, the
"5 W. H. Thomas to Mr. Leggett, 12 December 1917, WO 32/5597, PRO; letter from G. H.
Forster, 29 December 1917, ibid.; B. B. Cubitt (WO) to Bishop ofLondon, January 1918, ibid.
4" The Daily News (London), 13 March 1918; also see Convocation of Canterbury, Resolution,
6 February 1918, WO 32/5597, PRO; also seeArchbishop ofCanterbury to LordDerby, 15 February
1918, ibid.
47 Conference (11 July 1918), p. 7, WO 32/11404, PRO.
48 N. Rowell in Proceedings of Imperial War Conference, 13th Day (19 July 1918), pp. 4, 5,
WO 32/11404, PRO.
49 War Cabinet Memo (15 March 1918), WO 32/5597, PRO.
50 War Cabinet Conclusions, WC 366 (13), 18 March 1918, CAB 23/5, PRO; Batterbee to Creedy,
15 March 1918, WO 32/11404, PRO; Florence Underwood to Viscount Milner, 25 April 1918,
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March actions only worsened the problem by producing new critics of government
policy, while doing little about venereal disease rates. The army felt the government
had seriously erred in putting the brothels offlimits and frankly communicated that
feeling to London. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the
British Expeditionary Force complained that the government had surrendered to
people whose "main interest in the Army consists in the reduction offornication on
the part of its members." Far from doing that, the March order would only drive
French women into the streets to get men and probably with more success than
before. Ultimately, he predicted, venereal disease rates would rise and England's
combat strength would fall.6'
A more serious challenge came from Britain's feminists, who were aflame over the
solicitation regulation. More visible and less subject to control than military critics,
women's rights leaders also had supporters in Parliament who could make additional
troubleforthe wargovernment. Thewomen'sbasiccomplaintwasthattheregulation,
bysubjecting onlyfemales to criminalaction, was blatantly discriminatory. Moreover,
the policy opened the door to persecution and blackmail ofinnocent women, for the
most baseless accusation was enough to precipitate an arrest.52
Women's groups began protesting almost immediately. In April, the Women's
Freedom League, a group concerned about equal rights and opportunities, noted its
"horror" over Regulation40d anddemanded thattheWarOffice withdrawitimmedi-
ately. The League also threatened mass protests which would show the opposition,
theyclaimed, of a host ofsuffragette andtrades union societies.53 By theend ofApril,
such meetings were drawing public attention in London, and soon the government
began to come under fire in Parliament for promoting a policy ofsexual blackmail."
But civil rights activists were nottheregulation's onlycritics. Britishphysicians also
found fault with it. Many women with virulent cases ofsyphilis reacted negatively to
medical tests and thus fell beyond the grasp of the law. Even when tests confirmed
the presence of venereal disease, enough time had usually elapsed since contact to
make it impossible to say for sure who had given the disease to whom. Such un-
certainties resulted in the dismissal ofa large percentage ofpolice cases and a decline
ofpublic confidence in the regulation.55
Accordingly, street solicitation continued unchecked, which intensified pressure
from the Dominions. In an effort to explain the situation, one element in the British
Army felt the problem was due to too much deference to the civil libertarians.
"We are suffering from too many rights," one general insisted; "ifthe country were
under military government the question would be settled in aweek.""6 Despite such
objections, courts were determined to respect civil liberties, even in the midst of
war.57 But Dominion leaders cared little about that. What bothered them was the
threat to the health of their men.
51 Sir Douglas Haig to Secretary of State for War, 4 June 1918, WO 32/5597, PRO.
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Badly needing to find some way ofoffsetting the mountingcriticism, London turned
to the Americans for help. The new Secretary of State for War, Sir Alfred Milner,
began that April to discuss the possibility of an Anglo-American conference on
venereal disease. The Americans had an impressive record on VD and a collaborative
venture would show critics that the government was doing everything possible to
solve its problems.58 Milner initially broached the idea to Bishop Charles Henry
Brent, the chaplain general of the American Expeditionary Force. Brent put Milner
in touch with Pershing, and by early May he and Milner had set the date for the
conference's first session.59
The Americans were eager to meet for their own reasons. As U.S. troops found
their way to England, medical chief Ireland became as concerned about local con-
ditions as Dominion representatives. What Americans wanted was an extension of
Regulation 40d to cover their troops. Ireland also wanted London to take a tougher
line against French brothels in the beliefthat a united front could topple the French
system altogether.60
Also important was the opportunity the conference would give the Americans to
school the Old World in their approach to morality and health. To the public health
profession and to interested laymen ofthatday, venereal disease had implications that
went far beyond military considerations. At stake was the future of the race itself.
Blandly confident that they had found solutions to hygienic and moral problems
which still troubled most ofthe world, some Americans were excited by the prospect
of helping pull other peoples up to their mark. They had already shown the French
how to clean themselves up. Now they could do the same with the British. As Bishop
Brent told President Wilson, in seeking his support for the conference, the "moment
[is] opportune to secure through you in America and the Prime Minister here a united
effort to meet the whole sexual problem . .. with an upward thrust. Your voice can
reach the world on this vital matter."'61
The conference, which set as its goal the removal of the "temptations of overseas
troops," convened twice that spring and summer, first on 10 May and again on
11 July. Delegates included military, medical, and religious leaders of the American
and British Expeditionary Forces, and the Dominion forces, plus several keypolitical
and civic figures.
FromtheoutsetitwasclearthattheEnglishwerepresenttolearn andtheAmericans
to teach, although they played that role with proper humility.62 At the first session,
largely at the urging ofthe English, the Americans explained how they were handling
venereal disease. Contrasts between American and British methods were sharp,
provoking NCCVD president, Lord Sydenham, to admit later to Colonel Ireland
that "we are at least 5 years behind you.""
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The second session focused on ways that London might better protect British and
other allied servicemen in England. The Americans had a number of suggestions.
One way was to extend Britain's various protective regulations (such as Regulation
40d) to cover their servicemen. Conversely, the English might wish to apply several
American practices in their country, such as punishing those who sold liquor to
uniformed servicemen, having the government control a five-mile area around every
military encampment, and using women police. The Americans had found the latter
aneffective device todiscourageprostitution, anditwouldhelpthe Englishgetaround
their manpower problem, as well."
To safeguard those British servicemen who found a woman anyway, the Royal
Army and Navy should force men to use prophylactic stations within their units.
For servicemen who got infected in England far offfrom camp or ship, a network of
urban clinics was necessary.65
Of course the battle against venereal disease was not to be won in England alone.
There was also the situation in France with which to contend. It was the Americans'
hope that the British would join them in urging the French to close the brothels to
their own troops. As long as the maisons toldrees operated, allied troops would con-
tinue to run the risk ofdisease. In addition, the Americans would have French police
arrest and punish all unlicensed prostitutes." The British rejected the proposals
involving the French. In the matter of the maisons tolerees, Paris's delegate to the
conference made it clear that France was going to continue her policy ofreglementa-
tion, and London saw no advantage in assaulting a position to which an ally was
obviously committed.67
Otherwise, the English were agreeable to the American proposals. Lord Milner
promised to investigate the possibility of using women police, and he assured the
U.S. delegates that his government would extend their legal protections to the Ameri-
cans. On the matter ofmore effective military prophylaxis, Milner said that the War
Office was ready to order all commanders to use greater firmness in getting men to
report for treatment, and he was confident that they would be able to approximate
theAmericanpractice. As for urban clinics,Milner and the Archbishop ofCanterbury
promised to make the strongest appeals for action to both the Home Office and the
Local Government Board.68
Although the war's end just months later found London still struggling against
venereal disease, it was clear that the conference had moved the British towards the
solution ofsome oftheirproblems. At its August meeting, the War Cabinet discussed
American Expeditionary health methods and ended by directing the Home Secretary
to find ways to "remove temptation" at London's train depots.69 Had the emergency
continued, progress would likely have been made in many areas.
Politically, theconferenceproducedimmediate benefits. ByembracingtheAmerican
programme as a model for action, London was able to neutralize the growing
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opposition of the Dominions. Also the conference aided the War Cabinet in its
determination to retain Regulation 40d, forthegovernment could now argue that 40d
was not only helping to control venereal disease but also aidingthe American ally.70
II
Some years after the war, Pershing remarked that the conference had not been very
successful because "little came out of it that was of practical value to us."'7' From
that perspective, he was probably right. While the British did extend various domestic
regulations to the Americans, London refused to join the effort to eliminate the
French brothels, which was what the Americans wanted most. The British, however,
saw nojustification formixingintheinternal affairs ofan alliedpower, ifthatcountry
was determined to resist certain changes.
The two views on the question of the maisons tolerees pointed out better than
anything the difference between England's and America's approaches to prostitution
and venereal disease and at the same time helped to explain why American solutions
tended to be more effective. For the Americans, eliminating venereal disease in the
Armed Services was important enough tojustify almost any means-including coer-
cion and intimidation of fellow citizens, as well as meddling in the internal affairs of
friendly nations. The British, on the other hand, hewed closer to normal, peacetime
standards of diplomacy and civil liberties when dealing with venereal disease. They
interfered with citizens' freedom of movement only reluctantly, and when they did,
their courts followed the same stringent rules ofevidence used in peacetime.
Although one result of British forebearance was more disease than might have
developed otherwise, not all additional venereal disease was attributable to that
nation's concern for civil liberties. Certainly the insulation of the British military
from the kind ofdomestic pressures and values that impinged on American Services
accounted for part ofthe problem. With much of Britain's army scattered about the
empire before World War I, commanders developed the habit of following local
custom in matters of sex. Their American counterparts, however, because they were
subject to closer scrutiny from the folks at home, tended to mirror the standards of
theircountrymen.
That was not to say that Englishmen were unconcerned about the sexual habits of
their boys in uniform. In fact, another facet ofEngland's problem was that a certain
class of interested citizens wielded altogether too much influence. High-ranking
clergymen and upper-class moralists who took the lead in the anti-vice crusade
downplayed the medical approach to venereal disease, withthe result that such things
as clinics and prophylactic treatment never got the attention they did in the U.S.
Americans, though equally concerned with sin and purity, kept in mind that the main
goal was a healthy army and navy. Accordingly, it was they, more than any of the
other allies, who were able to demonstrate thepossibilities inherent in medical science
for solving one of man's oldest health problems.
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